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Abstract  We  address  the  inﬂuence  of  directors  who  represent  institutional  investors  in  three
aspects of  board  compensation  policies:  level  of  compensation,  composition,  and  performance
sensitivity.  We  differentiate  pressure-sensitive  directors  (i.e.,  with  business  links)  and  pressure-
resistant directors  (i.e.,  without  business  links).  Our  results  show  that  pressure-resistant
directors decrease  total  board  compensation  and  its  ﬁxed  proportion,  whereas  they  increase
the variable  proportion  of  total  remuneration  and  the  pay-for-performance  sensitivity.  By  con-
trast, pressure-sensitive  directors  offer  the  opposite  results.  These  ﬁndings  are  consistent  with
the view  that  institutional  investors  are  not  a  homogeneous  group  and  that  pressure-resistant
directors  fulﬁll  a  more  thorough  monitoring  role.
© 2013  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Board  of  directors;
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orporate  compensation  schemes  have  been  a  high  prior-
ty  issue  in  the  agenda  of  corporate  governance  reforms.
n  an  attempt  to  improve  corporate  governance  in  pub-
ic  ﬁrms  and  to  mitigate  potential  conﬂicts  of  interest,
he  European  Commission  recently  issued  several  rec-
mmendations  (2009/384/EC;  2009/385/EC)  to  enhance
ppropriate  compensation  policies,  more  detailed  disclosure
equirements,  and  a  higher  level  of  control  for  indepen-
ent  directors  and  shareholders  within  the  pay  setting
rocess.
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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In  this  debate  regarding  appropriate  compensation  poli-
ies,  90%  of  institutional  investors  believe  that  corporate
xecutives  are  overpaid  (Brandes  et  al.,  2008).  This  per-
eption  has  led  some  institutional  investors  to  give  up  their
raditional  passive  role  and  become  actively  engaged  in  the
ompensation  decisions  at  their  portfolio  ﬁrms  (Bushman
nd  Smith,  2001;  Hartzell  and  Starks,  2003).  As  institutional
nvestors  have  emerged  as  a  signiﬁcant  group  of  share-
olders  with  the  incentives  and  the  capabilities  to  check
anagerial  power,  these  investors  also  exercise  their  inﬂu-
nce  on  the  compensation  schemes  of  their  invested  ﬁrms
Parrino  et  al.,  2003).
The  literature  has  found  that  institutional  investors  inﬂu-
nce  both  the  level  and  the  structure  of  CEO  pay  in
ccordance  with  shareholder  interests,  which  may  be  in  con-
ict  with  the  interests  of  CEOs  (David  et  al.,  1998;  Hartzell
nd  Starks,  2003).  But,  although  prior  research  provides
igniﬁcant  insights  on  the  relationship  between  institu-
ional  investors’  ownership  and  compensation,  it  has  not
et  addressed  the  effect  of  these  shareholders  as  directors
nd  the  impact  of  their  different  nature  on  compensation
olicies.
With  the  notable  exceptions  of  Hempel  and  Fay  (1994),
oyd  (1996)  and  Cordeiro  et  al.  (2000),  most  previous  liter-
ture  focuses  on  CEO  and  executive  compensation,  so  little
s  known  about  the  determinants  of  the  pay  of  other  senior
ersonnel.  However,  rapid  growth  in  director  compensation
as  caused  a  big  controversy,  since  directors  serving  on  the
ompensation  committee  can  determine  the  level  and  mix
f  their  own  compensation  packages  (Cordeiro  et  al.,  2000).
his  fact  has  led  to  potential  conﬂicts  of  interests,  differ-
nt  to  the  conﬂicts  with  managers,  who  do  not  set  their
wn  salaries.  Indeed,  according  to  Dalton  and  Daily  (2001)
he  stock  based  compensation  for  directors  is  even  more
ontentious  than  similar  practices  for  ofﬁcers.
The  presence  of  directors  appointed  by  institutional
nvestors  on  the  board  is  rising  across  countries  and,  accord-
ngly,  these  institutions  are  becoming  more  inﬂuential  in  the
orporate  governance.  Heidrick  and  Struggles  (2011)  ﬁnd
hat,  although  directors  appointed  by  institutional  investors
nly  account  for  2%  of  British  ﬁrms  directorships,  they
ccount  for  40%  of  directorship  in  Spain,  35%  in  Belgium,
nd  22%  in  France.  Moreover,  due  to  an  alleged  lack  of
fﬁciency  of  independent  directors  in  European  countries,
ome  authors  highlight  that  the  supervising  role  in  these
nvironments  is  actually  played  by  directors  appointed  by
nstitutional  investors  (Sánchez  Ballesta  and  García  Meca,
007).  Given  the  widespread  importance  of  institutional
nvestors,  a  better  understanding  how  their  presence  on
oards  affects  their  own  compensation  schemes  is  clearly
eeded,  especially  in  civil-law  countries  where  these  direc-
ors  are  taking  up  an  increasingly  active  role  in  their  ﬁrms’
orporate  governance.
We  study  the  impact  of  institutional  directors  on  two
spects  of  remuneration  policy:  composition  and  sensitiv-
ty.  We  also  check  whether  institutional  directors  have  a
igniﬁcant  moderating  effect  on  the  relation  between  per-
ormance  and  board  remuneration.  The  literature  shows
hat  institutional  investors  do  not  act  as  a  monolithic  group
n  ﬁrm  governance  (Almazán  et  al.,  2005;  Cornett  et  al.,
007;  Chen  et  al.,  2007;  Choi  et  al.,  2012).  Accordingly,  we
ropose  that  the  type  of  business  relation  between  ﬁrms
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nd  institutional  investors  is  the  key  to  describing  the  role
f  institutional  directors.  We  therefore  study  the  relation
etween  remunerations  and  institutional  directors,  making
 distinction  between  the  institutional  investors  who  keep
usiness  relations  with  the  ﬁrm  on  whose  board  they  sit
nd  the  institutional  investors  whose  business  activity  is  not
elated  to  the  company  in  which  they  hold  a  directorship.
We  use  a  sample  of  Spanish  listed  ﬁrms  between  2004
nd  2010.  Spain  is  likely  the  best  paradigm  to  study  the
ffectiveness  of  institutional  directors  for  two  main  reasons.
irst,  Spain  is  the  European  country  with  the  highest  pres-
nce  of  institutional  investors  on  the  boards  of  large  ﬁrms
Bona  et  al.,  2011;  Crespí  and  Pascual,  2012).  Second,  the
panish  ﬁnancial  system  is  bank  oriented.  Banks  play  an  out-
tanding  role  both  as  creditors  and  blockholders.  Banks  also
ppoint  a  signiﬁcant  proportion  of  directors  to  the  boards  of
heir  client  ﬁrms.
Our  results  suggest  that  maintaining  business  ties
etween  ﬁrms  and  institutional  investors  affects  the  role  of
he  institutional  investors.  Directors  appointed  by  pressure-
esistant  investors  serve  a  monitoring  role  that  mitigates  the
gency  problem  between  shareholders  and  manager.  Coher-
nt  with  their  disciplinary  role,  pressure-resistant  directors
ncrease  the  relative  weight  of  the  variable  compensation,
ecrease  the  proportion  of  ﬁxed  compensation,  and  induce
ompensation  packages  sensitive  to  performance.  These
ndings  are  consistent  with  the  view  that  differences  exist
etween  these  two  types  of  directors  and  that  pressure-
esistant  directors  fulﬁll  a more  thorough  monitoring  role.
We  make  several  contributions  to  the  literature.  First,  we
rovide  new  evidence  on  the  effects  of  directors  appointed
y  institutional  investors  on  remuneration  policy  in  a  way
hat  is  difﬁcult  to  capture  in  the  US  or  UK  context,  where
his  kind  of  director  is  less  prevalent.  Existing  studies  on
he  effects  of  institutional  investors  are  commonly  based  in
he  framework  of  the  conventional  US/UK  model  of  corpo-
ate  control  and  therefore,  in  general,  focus  on  institutional
nvestors  solely  as  shareholders.  Second,  we  provide  new
vidence  on  the  effect  of  board  composition  on  director
emuneration.  Although  managerial  compensation  has  been
ften  analyzed,  directors’  pay  has  only  recently  sparked  an
ntense  debate  in  Europe.  The  wave  of  corporate  scandals
as  renewed  concerns  about  the  effectiveness  of  board  mon-
toring  and  the  high  compensations  that  directors’  receive.
inally,  our  examination  of  whether  institutional  investors’
resence  on  boards  of  different  types  of  institutions,  such
s  banks  or  investment  funds,  leads  to  observable  differ-
nces  in  remuneration  policy  can  provide  new  insights  on
he  heterogeneity  in  monitoring  costs  across  institutional
nvestors,  which,  in  turn,  has  important  implications  for  the
ebate  over  the  proper  degree  of  institutional  involvement
n  corporate  governance.
heoretical foundations and hypotheses
evelopment
heoretical  backgroundlthough  small  shareholders  can  vote  with  their  feet  if
hey  do  not  agree  with  the  performance  or  actions  of
anagers,  institutional  investors  ﬁnd  it  difﬁcult  to  ofﬂoad
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CInstitutional  directors  and  board  compensation  
their  substantial  investments  without  negatively  impact-
ing  stock  prices.  Given  the  cost  and  difﬁculty  of  selling
their  shareholdings,  institutions  are  motivated  to  pres-
sure  management  into  taking  actions  that  beneﬁt  outside
shareholders.  Institutional  investors  then  provide  a  strong
incentive  to  promote  company  activities  that  increase  the
ﬁrm’s  value  and  thus  the  value  of  their  own  investments
(Jensen  and  Warner,  1988).  Two  such  actions  may  moderate
excessive  pay  and  encourage  pay-for-performance  reward
systems.  Hartzell  and  Starks  (2003)  report  that  institutional
ownership  concentration  is  positively  related  to  the  pay-
for-performance  sensitivity  of  executive  compensation  and
negatively  related  to  the  level  of  compensation,  even  after
controlling  for  ﬁrm  size,  industry,  investment  opportunities,
and  performance.
The  concentrated  ownership  structure  of  European
countries,  as  Spain,  may  lead  result  in  other  conﬂicts  of
interests  such  as  o  the  so-called  principal--principal  agency
conﬂicts  (Hartzell  and  Starks,  2003;  Huddart,  1993;  Shleifer
and  Vishny,  1986;  Young  et  al.,  2008).  According  to  this  self-
serving  perspective,  institutional  investors,  acting  either  as
directors  or  in  collusion  with  managers,  may  engage  in  tun-
neling  activities  and  in  the  expropriation  of  wealth  from
minority  shareholders  (Johnson  et  al.,  2000;  Renders  and
Gaeremynck,  2012;  Shan,  2013).  Thus,  instead  of  imposing
an  efﬁcient  control  on  managerial  discretion,  institutional
shareholders  may  abuse  their  position  of  dominant  control
at  the  expense  of  the  other  stakeholders  to  expropriate
rents  from  the  noncontrolling  shareholders  (Harris  and  Raviv,
1988;  Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1997).
From  the  agency  theory  perspective,  the  board  of
directors  can  work  as  an  information  system  for  external
stakeholders  to  monitor  insiders  behavior.  In  this  con-
text,  directors  compensation  is  then  an  important  incentive
mechanisms  that  shape  director  behavior.  According  to  Davis
and  Stobaugh  (1995)  director  compensation  should  fulﬁll
several  goals:  (a)  motivate  them  to  align  their  interests  with
shareholders;  (b)  cover  responsibility  and  liability  risk;  (c)
be  consistent  with  transparency  in  director  compensation
setting.  A  key  issue  therefore  is  whether  directors  are  being
compensated  in  a  way  that  motivates  them  to  put  effort  and
make  decisions  that  maximize  the  return  of  the  shareholders
they  represent  to  (Cordeiro  et  al.,  2000).  Then,  although
nonexecutive  directors  and,  speciﬁcally,  those  appointed
by  institutional  investors  are  charged  with  looking  after
the  interests  of  shareholders,  there  are  reasons  to  ques-
tion  their  effectiveness.  Conﬂicts  of  interests  appear  where
directors  serving  on  the  compensation  committee  deter-
mine  the  level  and  mix  of  their  own  compensation  packages
(Cordeiro  et  al.,  2000).  In  exchange  for  excessive  compensa-
tion,  directors  may  be  more  lax  in  discharging  their  assigned
monitoring  and  oversight  functions  leading  them  to  expro-
priation  activities.  According  to  Chen  et  al.  (2013), these
potential  conﬂicts  of  interest  and  related  outcomes  may
ultimately  serve  to  erode  any  anticipated  beneﬁts  of  direc-
tor  compensation.
When  analyzing  the  consequences  of  directors  appointed
by  institutional  investors,  we  must  not  consider  them  as
a  homogeneous  group.  The  differences  across  institutional
investors  are  not  only  legal  or  regulatory  but  also  vary
in  terms  of  investment  strategy  and  the  incentives  and
resources  to  gather  information  and  to  engage  in  corporate
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overnance  (Bennett  et  al.,  2003).  Almazán  et  al.  (2005),
orokhovich  et  al.  (2006), Bushee  (1998),  Ferreira  and  Matos
2008)  and  Ramalingegowda  and  Yu  (2012)  have  shown
hat  certain  types  of,  but  not  all,  institutional  investors
ave  an  asymmetric  inﬂuence  on  corporate  issues  such  as
ntitakeover  amendments,  R&D  investment  decisions,  pro-
tability,  and  earnings  conservatism.
Along  this  line,  two  main  groups  of  institutional  direc-
ors  can  be  differentiated:  pressure-sensitive  institutional
nvestors  who  maintain  business  with  the  ﬁrm  in  which
hey  invest  --  basically,  banks  and  insurance  compa-
ies  --  and  pressure-resistant  institutional  investors  with
o  potential  business  links  --  basically,  investment  funds
nd  pension  funds.  According  to  Almazán  et  al.  (2005),
he  costs  of  monitoring  differ  across  both  groups,  with
he  potentially  active  group  (i.e.,  the  pressure-resistant
nvestors)  having  lower  costs.  Consistent  with  this  classiﬁca-
ion,  we  differentiate  between  pressure-sensitive  directors
i.e.,  representing  pressure-sensitive  institutional  investors)
nd  pressure-resistant  directors  (appointed  by  pressure-
esistant  institutional  investors).
ypotheses  development
anks  and  insurance  companies  face  different  regulatory,
egal,  and  competitive  environments  than  investment  funds.
avid  et  al.,  1998,  Almazán  et  al.,  2005  and  Shin  and  Seo
2011)  suggest  that  institutional  investors’  ﬁduciary  respon-
ibilities,  conﬂicts  of  interest,  and  asymmetric  information
nteract  with  each  other  to  determine  jointly  the  inﬂu-
nce  of  institutional  investors  on  remuneration.  They  argue
hat  pressure-resistant  institutional  investors  are  less  likely
o  suffer  from  conﬂicts  of  interest  arising  from  business
elationships  and,  thus,  more  likely  to  engage  actively  in
onitoring.  Consequently,  directors  who  represent  institu-
ions  without  business  relations  can  use  their  vote  power  to
ppose  preferences  for  more  generous  compensation.  Nev-
rtheless,  since  compensation  schemes  are  usually  viewed
s  an  incentive  mechanism,  one  could  assume  that  more  gen-
rous  compensation  packages  could  appeal  more  talented
irectors.  As  a  consequence,  the  question  about  the  relation
etween  the  different  types  of  institutional  directors  and
he  compensation  level  arises.  We  address  this  issue  in  an
xploratory  approach  and  run  preliminary  analyses  to  check
hether  pressure-resistant  or  sensitive  directors  are  related
o  higher  or  lower  director  compensation.
Critics  have  voiced  concerns  that  directors’  compensa-
ion  packages  have  not  been  closely  tied  to  ﬁrm  performance
Bebchuk  and  Fried,  2004).  As  an  example,  Bebchuk  and
rinstein  (2005)  argue  that  executive  pay  has  increased
ar  beyond  levels  that  can  be  explained  by  the  growth  in
rm  size  and  the  performance  observed  over  the  1993--2003
eriod.  Joining  compensation  to  performance  helps  align
oard  interests  with  shareholder  interests.  Explicit  ties
etween  directors’  wealth  and  the  ﬁrm’s  stock  price  provide
irectors  with  a  strong  incentive  to  increase  ﬁrm  value.
onsequently,  directors’  remuneration  should  be  positively
elated  to  ﬁrm  performance.  However,  due  to  the  conﬂicts
f  interests,  we  posit  that  directors  appointed  by  pressure-
esistant  institutional  investors  will  be  more  motivated  to
trengthen  the  relation  between  performance  and  board
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publish  since  2003.  These  corporate  governance  reports  do
not  provide  individualized  information  about  the  compen-
sation  of  each  director  but  do  provide  the  total  aggregate64  
ayments  than  directors  appointed  by  pressure-sensitive
nstitutional  investors.  The  higher  costs  of  monitoring  of
ressure-sensitive  directors,  related  to  differences  in  their
egal,  regulatory  and  competitive  environments  as  well  as
he  likelihood  of  current  or  future  business  dealing  with  the
rms  they  own,  may  weaken  the  relationship  between  ﬁrm
erformance  and  board  compensation.
This  intuition  is  consistent  with  Almazán  et  al.  (2005),
ho  ﬁnd  that  the  link  between  performance  and  manage-
ial  compensation  increases  with  the  concentration  of  active
nstitutions’  ownership  (pressure  resistant)  but  is  not  signif-
cantly  related  to  the  concentration  of  passive  institutions’
wnership  (pressure  sensitive).  Accordingly,  we  hypothesize
hat  a  similar  relation  should  hold  for  institutional  director-
hips:
1.  Pressure  resistant  (pressure-sensitive)  institutional
irectors  positively  (negatively)  moderate  the  relationship
etween  ﬁrm  performance  and  board  remunerations.
Given  this  discussion,  pressure-resistant  directors  should
e  able  to  counteract  managerial  dominance  and  to  align
ompensation  schemes  with  shareholders’  preferences.
irectors’  remuneration  packages  have  several  components
nd  vary  widely  across  ﬁrms.  Some  companies  reimburse
irectors’  expenses  for  attending  meetings  but  provide  no
dditional  compensation.  Other  companies  pay  a  uniform
nnual  cash  retainer  plus  per-meeting  fees.  Besides  cash
ompensation,  ﬁrms  may  provide  restricted  stocks  or  stock
ptions  to  committee  members.
We  consider  short-term  incentives  including  base  salary
nd  long-term  incentives  including  stock  options,  long-
erm  incentive  plans,  and  additional  beneﬁts.  A  number
f  good  reasons  exist  to  explain  why  long-term  incen-
ives  are  an  effective  pay  component  (Bryan  et  al.,  2000;
oergen  and  Renneboog,  2011).  First,  they  provide  the  most
irect  link  between  ﬁrm  performance  and  pay.  Therefore,
hey  may  incentivize  directors  to  work  hard  and  to  make
hareholder-oriented  decisions.  Second,  long-term  incen-
ives  may  enable  the  ﬁrm  to  bring  valuable  human  capital
o  the  board  and  to  ensure  the  loyalty  of  the  incumbent
irectors.  However,  according  to  the  European  Commission
ariable  pay  schemes  have  become  increasingly  complex
nd  have  led  to  excessive  remuneration  and  manipulation
EUCGF,  2009).  This  ﬁnding  suggests  that  board-incentive
ay  is  a  two-edged  sword:  on  the  one  hand,  it  can  align  the
nterests  of  controlling  and  minority  shareholders;  on  the
ther  hand,  it  can  induce  undesirable  behavior  and  overly
enerous  board  pay  (Shin  and  Seo,  2011).
We  posit  that  the  incentives  of  institutional  directors  to
onitor  composition  board  pay  depend  on  the  conﬂicts  of
nterest  that  the  institutional  directors  face.  These  con-
icts  are  more  pronounced  when  institutional  investors  have
usiness  ties  with  the  ﬁrm.  Due  to  the  lower  conﬂicts
f  interests  and  their  interest  in  aligning  board  inter-
sts  with  shareholder  interests,  we  posit  that  directors
ppointed  by  pressure-resistant  institutional  investors  will
refer  long-term  incentive  plans  than  directors  appointed  by
ressure-sensitive  ones.  A  large  stock-based  component  that
ies  board  pay  to  ﬁrm  performance  is  believed  to  increase
oard  pay  risk  and  help  align  the  directors’  interest  with
hose  of  shareholders.  Accordingly,  we  hypothesize  that
i
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ressure-sensitive  directors  will  prefer  to  retain  control  over
heir  pay  by  receiving  a  higher  proportion  of  ﬁxed  compensa-
ion  and  a  lower  proportion  of  variable  compensation.  The
igher  conﬂicts  of  interests,  their  risk  aversion  as  lenders
nd  their  incentives  to  minimize  the  probability  of  default
ay  explain  these  expectations.  Consequently,  our  second
ypothesis  is  stated  as  follows:
2.  Directors  representing  pressure-resistant  institutional
nvestors  are  negatively  related  to  board’  ﬁxed  salary
short-term  compensation)  and  positively  related  with  their
ariable  compensation  (long-term  incentives),  compared  to
irectors  representing  pressure-sensitive  investors.
One  of  the  most  often  used  mechanisms  to  tie  the
ncentives  of  insiders  to  shareholders’  interests  is  pay-for-
erformance  schemes  (Jensen  and  Murphy,  1990).  Although
here  are  not  any  evidence  in  this  context  regarding
oard  remuneration  as  a  whole,  David  et  al.  (1998)  and
lmazán  et  al.  (2005)  ﬁnd  that  pressure-resistant  insti-
utional  investors  are  more  likely  than  pressure-sensitive
nstitutional  investors  to  inﬂuence  CEO  pay  in  accordance
ith  shareholder  preferences.  More  speciﬁcally,  the  stake
f  these  institutional  investors  is  negatively  associated  with
he  level  of  CEO  pay  but  positively  associated  with  pay-for-
erformance  sensitivity.
We  suggest  that  directors  appointed  by  banks  and
nsurance  companies  will  have  more  pronounced  conﬂicts,
eading  them  to  compromise  their  role  in  monitoring  director
ay.  Thus,  pressure-sensitive  directors  will  be  less  interested
n  tying  directors’  pay  to  ﬁrm  performance.  Conversely,
ressure-resistant  directors  have  more  ability  to  use  their
osition  to  discipline  other  directors  preferences  and  will
herefore  be  more  prone  to  link  the  compensation  packages
o  the  ﬁrm’s  performance.
3.  Directors  representing  pressure-resistant  institutional
nvestors  will  increase  board  remuneration  sensitivity  more
han  directors  representing  pressure-sensitive  investors.
mpirical design
ample
ur  sample  is  drawn  from  the  population  of  Spanish  non-
nancial  ﬁrms  listed  on  the  Spanish  Stock  Exchange  during
004--2010.  We  exclude  ﬁnancial  companies  both  because
hey  are  under  special  scrutiny  by  ﬁnancial  authorities  that
onstrain  the  role  of  their  board  of  directors  and  because
f  their  special  accounting  practices.  We  obtain  our  data
rom  two  databases.  Financial  information  and  ﬁrms’  mar-
et  value  come  from  the  Amadeus  database.1 Corporate
overnance  information  is  collected  from  the  annual  cor-
orate  governance  reports  that  all  listed  companies  must1 Amadeus is a product of Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publish-
ng and provides comparable standardized ﬁnancial information for
ompanies across Europe.
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compensation  of  the  board  members  and  its  distribution
among  the  different  components.
We  build  an  unbalanced  panel  of  627  ﬁrm-year  observa-
tions  from  162  ﬁrms.  Roughly,  our  sample  accounts  for  more
than  95%  of  the  capitalization  of  Spanish  nonﬁnancial  ﬁrms.
The  panel  is  unbalanced  because  during  this  period  some
ﬁrms  become  public  and  other  ﬁrms  delist  as  a  consequence
of  mergers  and  acquisitions.  Nevertheless,  the  estimations
based  on  unbalanced  panels  are  as  reliable  as  those  based
on  balanced  panels  (Arellano,  2003).
Variables
We  deﬁne  four  dependent  variables  that  are  consistent
with  each  one  of  our  hypotheses.  RETRIB  is  the  average
annual  compensation  of  each  director,  deﬁned  as  the  total
compensation  of  the  whole  board  of  directors  divided  by
the  number  of  directors.  FIXCOMP  is  the  ﬁxed  proportion
of  the  compensation,  deﬁned  as  the  quotient  between  the
total  ﬁxed  compensation  and  the  total  compensation  of  the
whole  board  of  directors.  VARCOMP  is  the  variable  com-
ponent  of  the  compensation,  deﬁned  as  the  ratio  of  total
variable  compensation  to  the  total  compensation  of  all
the  board  members.2 SENSITIVITY  is  the  sensitivity  of  the
average  compensation  of  the  directors  to  changes  in  ﬁrm
performance,  which  is  operationalized  as  the  variation  in  the
compensation  of  the  board  relative  to  the  variation  of  return
on  assets  (ROA)  between  the  previous  and  the  current  year.
We  deﬁne  three  main  independent  variables  related
to  the  presence  of  institutional  investors  in  the  board  of
directors.  To  begin,  we  deﬁne  INSTIT  as  the  proportion  of
directors  appointed  by  institutional  investors.  We  then  make
the  distinction  between  pressure-sensitive  and  pressure-
resistant  directors.  Thus,  we  deﬁne  SENSIT  as  the  proportion
of  board  members  who  represent  pressure-sensitive  institu-
tional  investors  (i.e.,  banks  and  insurance  companies)  and
RESIST  as  the  proportion  of  the  board  members  who  rep-
resent  pressure-resistant  institutional  investors  (primarily
mutual  funds  and  pension  funds).  We  also  interact  INSTIT,
SENSIT,  and  RESIST  with  the  previous  year’s  ROA  to  compute
INSTITROA,  SENSITROA,  and  RESISTROA,  respectively.  These
three  variables  introduce  the  moderating  effect  of  the  board
composition  conditional  on  the  performance  of  the  ﬁrm.
We  control  for  a  number  of  factors  that  can  potentially
affect  retributions  and  that  make  our  research  comparable
to  previous  studies  (Almazán  et  al.,  2005;  David  et  al.,  1998;
Doucouliagos  et  al.,  2007;  Fernández  Méndez  et  al.,  2012;
Sánchez  Marín  et  al.,  2013).  SIZE  is  the  log  of  total  assets
and  is  a  measure  of  ﬁrm  size.  LEV  is  the  ﬁnancial  leverage
variable,  measured  as  the  ratio  of  book  value  of  debt  to
total  assets.  MTB  is  the  equity  market-to-book  value,  which
proxies  both  growth  opportunities  and  market  expectations
about  the  ﬁrm.  We  also  control  for  ROA.  Appendix  provides
a  summary  of  all  the  variables.
2 Although FIXCOMP and VARCOMP may be in opposition, these
variables are not the only components to consider. Total retribution
may also include meetings attendance fees, stocks, options, and
other ways of compensation.
t
r
r
t
a
o
s
m165
mpirical  method
e  ﬁrst  report  a  descriptive  analysis  to  show  the  main  char-
cteristics  of  our  sample.  This  step  provides  preliminary
vidence  about  the  possible  effect  of  institutional  directors
n  the  compensation  of  the  directors  and  about  possible  dif-
erences  between  the  types  of  institutional  directors.  Next,
e  perform  an  explanatory  analysis  to  test  our  hypotheses.
e  run  the  following  baseline  model:
OMPENSATit =  ˛  +  ˇ1 · LEVit−1 +  ˇ2 ·  MTBit +  ˇ3 · SIZEit
+  ˇ4 ·  ROAit +
∑
ˇj ·  BOARDit
+
∑
ˇj ·  BOARDROAit +  i +  t +  εit,
here  COMPENSAT  represents  the  variables  of  directors
ompensation  as  previously  deﬁned;  BOARDit represents  the
ariables  of  institutional  directorships;  BOARDROAit rep-
esents  the  interaction  between  ROA  and  the  variables
f  institutional  directorships;  i represents  the  individual
ffect;  i represents  the  time  effect;  and  εit represents  the
tochastic  error.  The  time  effect  includes  the  macroeco-
omic  factors  that  affect  all  the  ﬁrms  in  the  same  period.
Our  database  combines  time-series  with  cross-sectional
ata,  allowing  for  the  formation  of  panel  data,  which
e  estimate  with  the  appropriate  panel  data  methodology
Arellano,  2003).  In  the  estimation  of  our  model,  two  prob-
ems  can  arise:  constant  and  unobservable  heterogeneity
nd  endogeneity.  Constant  and  unobservable  heterogeneity
efers  to  speciﬁc  characteristics  of  each  ﬁrm  that  remain
onstant  over  time  as  represented  by  the  ﬁxed-effects  term
i.  Because  they  are  unobservable,  they  become  part  of
he  random  component  in  the  estimated  model.  Panel  data
ethodology  enhances  the  control  of  this  constant  and
nobservable  heterogeneity  introduced  by  the  ﬁxed-effects
erm.
The  endogeneity  problem  may  appear  because  lagged
irectors’  compensation  can  affect  the  structure  of  the
oard  of  directors  (Demsetz  and  Villalonga,  2001;  Hermalin
nd  Weisbach,  1998;  Villalonga  and  Amit,  2006).  To  address
his  problem,  Blundell  and  Bond  (1998)  and  Bond  (2002)
uggest  the  use  of  the  panel  data  system  estimator.  This  pro-
edure  is  an  improved  version  of  the  generalized  method
f  moments,  given  the  possibility  that  weak  instruments
an  induce  poor  asymptotic  precision  (Alonso-Borrego  and
rellano,  1999).  This  method  provides  efﬁcient  estimates
hose  consistency  depends  critically  on  the  absence  of
econd-order  serial  autocorrelation  in  the  residuals  and  on
he  validity  of  the  instruments  (Arellano  and  Bond,  1991).
ccordingly,  we  report  the  m2 test.  To  test  the  validity  of
he  instruments,  we  use  the  Hansen  test  of  overidentifying
estrictions,  which  allows  us  to  test  the  absence  of  a  cor-
elation  between  the  instruments  and  the  error  term  and,
herefore,  to  check  the  validity  of  the  selected  instruments.
As  an  alternative  way  to  address  the  endogeneity  issues
nd  to  check  the  consistency  of  our  results,  we  also  estimate
ur  model  using  the  instrumental  variables  method.  More
peciﬁcally,  we  implement  the  two-stages  least  squares
ethod  to  instrument  the  corporate  governance  variables.
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Table  1  Main  descriptive  statistics.
Variable  Mean  Std.  dev.  Q25  Q50  Q75
RETRIB  468.59  22.085  134.58  284.44  545.24
FIXCOMP  0.452  0.271  0.234  0.432  0.623
VARCOMP  0.391  0.291  0.151  0.371  0.638
SENSITIVITY  0.029  1.757  −0.025  0.001  0.038
INSTIT 0.207  0.181  0.000  0.182  0.313
SENSIT 0.072  0.11  0.000  0.000  0.125
RESIST 0.137  0.182  0.000  0.083  0.200
SIZE 13.592  2.021  12.192  13.471  14.862
LEV 0.593 0.183 0.483 0.611  0.729
MTB 2.656 2.529 1.31 1.984 3.117
ROA  0.041 0.076 0.013 0.041 0.077
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negative  effect.  These  results  do  suggest  that  the  only  typeThis table provides the mean, standard deviation, and quartiles
of the main variables. See Appendix for variable deﬁnitions.
esults
escriptive  statistics
able  1  presents  the  mean  value,  the  standard  error,  and
he  quartiles  of  the  main  variables.  The  representatives  of
nstitutional  investors  account  for  around  21%  of  director-
hips,  with  pressure-resistant  directors  twice  as  important
s  pressure-sensitive  directors.  Consistent  with  the  inter-
ational  trend  to  increase  the  importance  of  institutional
nvestors  (Li  et  al.,  2006),  the  proportion  of  directors
ppointed  by  institutional  investors  in  our  sample  increases
rom  19.6%  in  2004  to  21.7%  in  2010.
Table  2  reports  the  correlation  matrix  among  the  varia-
les.  With  the  exception  of  some  relations  among  the
ariables  of  corporate  governance,  all  of  them  present  low
orrelation  coefﬁcients,  so  that  multicollinearity  should  not
e  a  concern.  In  addition,  the  possibility  of  multicollinearity
an  be  ruled  out  on  the  basis  of  two  facts.  First,  our  model
s  a  parsimonious  one,  so  the  variables  of  corporate  gover-
ance  (INSTIT,  SENSIT,  and  RESIST)  are  not  simultaneously
ncluded  in  the  model.  Second,  we  also  provide  a  variance
nﬂation  factor  (VIF).  Our  VIF  scores  are  below  3,  and  thus
e  conﬁrm  that  multicollinearity  does  not  skew  our  results
Belsley  et  al.,  2004;  Kutner  et  al.,  2005).
o
b
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Table  2  Correlation  matrix.
RETRIB  FIXCOMP  VARCOMP  SENSITIVITY  
FIXCOMP  −0.248
VARCOMP  0.228  −0.739
SENSITIVITY  −0.106  −0.013  −0.013
INSTIT  −0.058  0.126  −0.114  −0.063
SENSIT  0.036  0.135  −0.184  −0.066  
RESIST −0.081  0.048  −0.004  −0.025  
SIZE 0.554  −0.160  0.187  −0.052  
LEV 0.178  −0.048  0.009  −0.073  
MTB 0.050  −0.054  0.077  −0.030  
ROA 0.158  −0.055  0.200  −0.054  
VIF 
This table presents the Pearson’s correlation matrix. See Appendix forF.  López-Iturriaga  et  al.
For  an  exploratory  analysis,  we  divide  the  sam-
le  into  two  groups  depending  on  the  proportion  of
nstitutional  investors  (pressure-sensitive  investors  and
ressure-resistant  investors)  in  the  boardroom:  the  group  of
rms  with  the  proportion  of  institutional  directors  over  the
NSTIT  median  value  and  the  group  of  ﬁrms  with  the  pro-
ortion  of  institutional  directors  under  the  INSTIT  median
alue.  The  same  pattern  applies  to  SENSIT  and  RESIST
ariables.  Then,  we  conduct  a  test  of  means  comparison
o  explore  whether  compensation  schemes  are  different
etween  both  groups.  Table  3  reports  the  results.  Although
ot  conclusive,  the  ﬁndings  suggest  that  gray  directors
ppointed  by  institutional  investors  are  related  to  differ-
nces  in  directors’  compensation.  Whereas  the  proportion
f  institutional  directors  does  not  seem  to  induce  signiﬁcant
ifferences,  pressure-sensitive  directors  have  asymmetric
ffects,  compared  to  pressure-resistant  directors.  More
peciﬁcally,  directors  representing  pressure-resistant  insti-
utional  investors  are  positively  related  to  the  variable
omponent  and  negatively  related  to  the  ﬁxed  part  of  the
ompensation.  Conversely,  pressure-sensitive  directors  are
elated  to  a  higher  ﬁxed  part  and  to  a  lower  variable  com-
onent  of  directors’  compensation.
xplanatory  analysis
able  4  provides  the  estimates  related  to  total  compen-
ation.  We  test  the  effects  of  all  institutional  directors,
ressure-sensitive  institutional  directors,  and  pressure-
esistant  institutional  directors  on  the  average  compen-
ation  of  directors  (RETRIB).  Column  (1)  shows  that  all
nstitutional  directors  (INSTIT)  have  a direct  negative  rela-
ion  on  RETRIB.  This  result  is  in  line  with  some  other  studies
hat  focus  on  Anglo-Saxon  countries  in  which  institutional
wnership  make  some  appreciable  differences  in  the  level
f  policy  pay  (Cosh  and  Hughes,  2007).
More  interesting,  columns  (2)  and  (3)  show  that  RESIST
oes  not  have  a  signiﬁcant  impact  on  the  total  compen-
ation  of  each  director,  whereas  SENSIT  has  a  signiﬁcantf  institutional  directors  effectively  affecting  the  whole
oard  compensation  is  the  pressure-sensitive  one.  These
esults  can  be  understood  at  the  light  of  the  different
INSTIT  SENSIT  RESIST  SIZE  LEV  MTB
0.394
0.811  −0.218
0.060  0.229  −0.082
0.171  0.068  0.138  0.434
−0.094  −0.069  −0.055  0.095  0.082
−0.180  −0.077  −0.142  0.132  −0.335  0.353
1.560  1.470  1.430  1.360  1.260  1.130
 variable deﬁnitions.
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Table  4  Generalized  method  of  moments  estimates  of  the
baseline  model  (total  compensation).
(1)  (2)  (3)
INSTIT  −1.063***
(0.162)
RESIST  −2.715
(25.32)
SENSIT  −257.2***
(26.68)
SIZE 144.2*** 145.5*** 144.0***
(4.007)  (4.629)  (6.721)
LEV 119.2*** 94.56*** 170.9***
(8.480)  (13.13)  (29.11)
MTB 4.925*** 5.348*** 11.44***
(1.327)  (1.073)  (1.868)
ROA −1.062*** −0.823*** −2.927***
(0.235)  (0.235)  (0.439)
Observations  433  433  433
m2 1.01  1.00  0.97
Hansen  test  (d.f.)  63.14(72)  69.02(72)  68.25(72)
This table provides the estimated coefﬁcients (t-stats) through
the generalized method of moments. The dependent variable
is RETRIB. See Appendix for variable deﬁnitions. m2 is a test
of second order serial autocorrelation. Hansen test is a test of
overidentifying restrictions, which distributes as 2 (degrees of
freedom).
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ncentives  that  pressure-resistant  and  pressure-sensitive
irectors  face.  Since  pressure-resistant  ones  are  supposed
o  provide  a  more  independent  managerial  oversight,
he  higher  compensation  of  boards  with  pressure-resistant
irectors  can  be  due  to  the  compensation  package  work-
ng  as  an  incentive  for  better  corporate  performance  when
irectors  are  interested  in  providing  such  oversight.
Consistent  with  Almazán  et  al.  (2005), Khan  et  al.  (2005)
nd  Shin  and  Seo  (2011), the  estimates  of  our  control  varia-
les  show  that  directors  of  the  larger  ﬁrms  (SIZE)  receive
igher  ﬁxed  compensation.  Directors  of  larger  companies
re  expected  to  be  paid  more  than  directors  of  small  ﬁrms
ue  to  the  higher  degree  of  complexity  of  tasks,  the  poten-
ially  greater  value  placed  on  directors’  decisions,  and,
ence,  the  greater  reward  from  making  them  (Doucouliagos
t  al.,  2007).  In  the  same  vein,  directors  of  more  leveraged
rms  and  ﬁrms  with  more  growth  opportunities  have  a  higher
ompensation.
We  now  test  hypothesis  H1  and  the  way  in  which  ROA
ffects  directors’  compensation  depending  on  the  type  of
nstitutional  investors  (Table  5).  In  Column  1  we  report  the
road  effect  of  institutional  directorship:  while,  consistent
ith  Table  4, INSTIT  have  a  negative  effect  on  directors
ompensation,  the  interaction  with  ROA  has  a positive  and
igniﬁcant  effect.  It  means  that,  although  the  representa-
ion  of  institutional  investors  in  the  board  of  directors  can
educe  the  average  total  compensation,  it  also  ties  it  to
he  performance  of  the  ﬁrm  or  the  board.  Furthermore,
hen  splitting  this  effect  into  the  inﬂuence  of  both  kinds
f  institutional  investors,  we  ﬁnd  asymmetric  effects.  On
he  one  hand,  the  positive  coefﬁcient  of  RESIST·ROA  implies
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Table  5  Generalized  method  of  moments  estimates  of  the
baseline  model  (total  compensation).
(1)  (2)  (3)
INSTIT  −1.316***
(0.147)
INSTIT·ROA  0.201***
(0.0133)
RESIST  13.96
(26.82)
RESIST·ROA 4.019**
(1.592)
SENSIT  −267.8***
(57.69)
SENSIT·ROA −0.0443
(5.115)
SIZE 150.2*** 146.8*** 149.3***
(5.347)  (5.099)  (7.582)
LEV 219.2*** 119.3*** 167.0***
(16.93)  (20.20)  (34.90)
MTB 2.990*** 4.598*** 10.89***
(0.863)  (1.137)  (1.954)
ROA −2.777*** −1.205*** −3.011***
(0.362)  (0.358)  (0.448)
Observations  433  433  433
m2 1.01  0.97  0.94
Hansen  test  (d.f.)  67.67(72)  66.39(72)  63.55(72)
This table provides the estimated coefﬁcients (t-stats) through
the generalized method of moments. The dependent variable
is RETRIB. See Appendix for variable deﬁnitions. m2 is a test
of second order serial autocorrelation. Hansen test is a test of
overidentifying restrictions, which distributes as 2 (degrees of
freedom).
** Conﬁdence at 95% level.
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Table  6  Generalized  method  of  moments  estimates  of  the
baseline  model  (proportion  of  ﬁxed  compensation).
(1)  (2)  (3)
INSTIT  −0.132***
(0.0245)
RESIST  −19.04***
(3.456)
SENSIT  22.96***
(4.342)
SIZE −5.152*** −5.283*** −5.441***
(0.406)  (0.419)  (0.393)
LEV 32.93*** 33.08*** 17.17***
(2.053)  (2.197)  (3.994)
MTB −3.237*** −3.220*** −2.214***
(0.142)  (0.143)  (0.214)
ROA 0.258*** 0.350*** 0.214***
(0.0756)  (0.0615)  (0.0536)
Observations  434  434  434
m2 −0.32  −0.27  0.22
Hansen  test  70.88(72)  69.97(72)  69.42(72)
This table provides the estimated coefﬁcients (t-stats) through
the generalized method of moments. The dependent variable
is FIXCOMP. See Appendix for variable deﬁnitions. m2 is a test
of second order serial autocorrelation. Hansen test is a test of
overidentifying restrictions, which distributes as 2 (degrees of
freedom).
*** Conﬁdence at 99% level.
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hat  pressure  resistant  directors  tie  the  board  compensation
o  the  performance  of  the  board.  On  the  other  hand,  the
on-signiﬁcant  coefﬁcient  of  SENSIT·ROA  suggests  a  less
isciplinary  role  for  this  kind  of  investors  since  the  compen-
ation  and  incentives  of  the  board  are  not  so  closely  tied  to
ts  performance.  The  results  of  this  empirical  analysis  are
onsistent  with  the  implications  of  our  model  that  pressure-
esistant  directors  can  provide  more  intense  monitoring  of
orporate  management.
We  now  address  the  question  about  whether  the  compo-
ition  of  the  compensation  package  depends  on  the  type  of
irectors  representing  institutional  investors  (H2).  Table  6
eports  the  results  of  the  estimations  in  which  FIXCOMP
the  ﬁxed  proportion)  is  the  dependent  variable.  Column
1)  shows  that  the  broad  effect  of  all  institutional  directors
INSTIT)  is  a  lower  base  salary.
Table  6  shows  the  results  for  the  different  types  of
nstitutional  directors  and  different  patterns  for  propor-
ion  of  ﬁxed  compensation.  The  negative  coefﬁcient  of
ESIST  in  Column  (2)  suggests  that  pressure-resistant  direc-
ors  tend  to  reduce  the  ﬁxed  proportion  of  the  salary.
onversely,  Column  (3)  shows  that  directors  represent-
ng  pressure-sensitive  institutional  investors  increase  the
xed  component  of  the  compensation,  which  conﬁrms  H2.
b
l
pccording  to  these  results,  the  directors  appointed  by
nstitutional  investors  have  a  completely  different  effect
n  the  ﬁxed  component  of  the  compensation  conditional
n  the  nature  of  the  institutional  investor.  This  result
an  be  understood  in  terms  of  the  ability  to  monitor  of
ach  group  of  institutional  investors.  Since  pressure  resis-
ant  investors  have  lower  implied  costs  of  monitoring,  our
esults  are  consistent  with  Almazán  et  al.  (2005),  who  ﬁnd
hat  directors  representing  active  institutional  investors
pressure-resistant  directors)  face  lower  costs  of  monitor-
ng  than  the  directors  appointed  by  passive  institutions
pressure-sensitive  directors).
Table  7  reports  consistent  results  when  we  estimate
he  determinants  of  the  variable  component  of  directors’
ompensation  (VARCOMP).  Column  (1)  shows  that  directors
epresenting  institutional  investors  increase  the  variable
omponent.  Nevertheless,  the  inﬂuence  of  institutional
irectors  on  the  variable  component  of  the  compensation
s  not  homogeneous.  Coherent  with  a  more  disciplinary
ole,  RESIST  exhibits  a  positive  impact,  so  that  pressure-
esistant  directors  increase  the  relative  weight  of  the
ariable  compensation.  On  the  contrary,  consistent  with
he  view  that  pressure-sensitive  investors  are  more  tran-
ient,  the  proportion  of  these  directors  (SENSIT)  has  a
egative  inﬂuence.  Due  to  the  lower  conﬂicts  of  inter-
sts  and  their  interest  in  aligning  board  interests  with
hareholder  interests,  we  conﬁrm  that  directors  appointed
y  pressure-resistant  institutional  investors  will  prefer
ong-term  incentive  plans  than  directors  appointed  by
ressure-sensitive  institutional  investors.
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Table  7  Generalized  method  of  moments  estimates  of  the
baseline  model  (variable  proportion  of  board  compensation).
(1)  (2)  (3)
INSTIT  0.141***
(0.0386)
RESIST  17.79***
(2.337)
SENSIT  −45.94***
(7.607)
SIZE 3.949*** 3.669*** 4.189***
(0.391)  (0.296)  (0.391)
LEV −13.44*** −12.72*** −9.101**
(2.774)  (2.547)  (3.486)
MTB 0.632*** 0.495*** 0.330*
(0.140)  (0.146)  (0.170)
ROA 0.179*** 0.178*** 0.0279
(0.0454)  (0.0502)  (0.0312)
Observations  414  414  414
m2 −1.61  −1.18  −1.25
Hansen  test  (d.f)  62.53(72)  57.10(72)  60.32(72)
This table provides the estimated coefﬁcients (t-stats) through
the generalized method of moments. The dependent variable is
VARCOMP. See Appendix for deﬁnition of variables. m2 is a test
of second order serial autocorrelation. Hansen test is a test of
overidentifying restrictions, which distributes as 2 (degrees of
freedom).
* Conﬁdence at 90% level.
** Conﬁdence at 95% level.
Table  8  Generalized  method  of  moments  estimates
of the  baseline  model  (sensitivity  of  compensation  to
performance).
(1)  (2)  (3)
INSTIT  0.00849***
(0.00284)
RESIST  1.095*
(0.649)
SENSIT  −1.338***
(0.336)
SIZE 1.402*** −0.163 −0.200
(0.0636)  (0.146)  (0.136)
LEV −3.167*** −3.820*** −4.417***
(0.242)  (0.384)  (0.437)
MTB 0.0141*** −0.0353*** −0.0314***
(0.00347)  (0.00353)  (0.00378)
ROA −0.00241** 0.0270*** 0.0255***
(0.00120)  (0.00433)  (0.00433)
Observations  401  401  401
m2 1.02  0.83  0.83
Hansen  test  73.49(66)  70.69(66)  73.43(66)
This table provides the estimated coefﬁcients (t-stats) through
the generalized method of moments. The dependent variable is
SENSITIVITY. See Appendix for deﬁnition of variables. m2 is a test
of second order serial autocorrelation. Hansen test is a test of
overidentifying restrictions, which distributes as 2 (degrees of
freedom).
* Conﬁdence at 90% levels.
** Conﬁdence at 95% level.
*** Conﬁdence at 99% level.
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These  results  are  in  line  with  David  et  al.  (1998)  and
Almazán  et  al.  (2005),  who  ﬁnd  that  pressure-resistant  insti-
tutional  investors  are  more  likely  than  pressure-sensitive
institutional  investors  to  align  pay  policy  to  shareholder
preferences.
In  any  case,  the  variable  remuneration  can  have  some
effects  on  risk.  The  European  Commission  has  found  that
the  incentives  created  by  variable  pay  schemes  may  have
resulted  in  excessive  risk  taking  and  in  ever-increasing  lev-
els  of  remuneration  (EUCGF,  2009).  From  this  point  of  view,
our  results  may  shed  some  light  on  the  relation  between
institutional  investors  and  corporate  risk  taking  (Crespí  and
Pascual,  2012;  Shin  and  Seo,  2011).
A  comparison  of  Tables  6  and  7  provides  interesting
insights  regarding  the  control  variables.  SIZE  and  MTB  have
a  negative  inﬂuence  on  the  ﬁxed  component  and  a  positive
inﬂuence  on  the  variable  component.  These  ﬁndings  mean
that  larger  companies  and  ﬁrms  with  more  growth  oppor-
tunities  tend  to  rely  more  on  the  variable  component  than
on  the  base  salary.  Conversely,  ﬁnancial  leverage  shows  the
opposite  effect:  it  has  a  positive  effect  on  ﬁxed  compensa-
tion  and  a  negative  effect  on  variable  compensation.
Finally,  Table  8  provides  the  results  related  to  H3,  con-
cerning  the  sensitivity  of  compensation  to  performance.
Column  (1)  shows  that  institutional  directors  have  a  positive
inﬂuence  on  pay-performance  sensitivity.  Nevertheless,  sig-
niﬁcant  differences  exist  between  both  types  of  institutional
investors,  as  shown  in  columns  (2)  and  (3).  The  coefﬁcient  of
RESIST  is  positive  in  comparison  to  the  negative  coefﬁcient
f
d
pf  SENSIT,  which  suggests  that  the  directors  representing
ressure-resistant  investors  induce  compensation  packages
ensitive  to  performance  whereas  pressure-sensitive  direc-
ors  do  not.  Again,  this  result  is  consistent  with  the  view
hat  the  different  types  of  directors  take  on  different  roles
nd  that  pressure-resistant  directors  undertake  a  more  thor-
ugh  monitoring  role.  In  line  with  John  et  al.  (2010)  and
ohn  and  Qian  (2003), the  pay-for-performance  sensitivity
f  board  compensation  decreases  with  the  leverage  ratio
nd  increases  with  ﬁrm  size  at  the  1%  level.
As  previously  noted,  we  present  some  further  analysis
o  check  the  sensitivity  of  our  results  to  different  estima-
ion  methods  to  address  the  endogeneity  problem.  We  run
ew  estimates  using  the  two-stages  least  squares  method.
able  9  reports  the  estimates  for  the  models  in  which
otal  compensation  (RETRIB)  is  the  dependent  variable:  in
olumns  (1)--(3)  we  explore  the  effect  of  institutional  direc-
ors  on  the  board  compensation  and  in  Columns  (4)--(6)  we
est  our  ﬁrst  hypothesis  about  the  differential  moderating
ffect  of  each  kind  of  directors.  Table  10  reports  the  esti-
ates  for  the  models  in  which  the  ﬁxed  component  of  the
ompensation  (FIXCOMP)  --  Columns  (1)--(3)  --  the  variable
omponent  (VARCOMP)  --  Columns  (4)--(6)  --  and  the  pay-
or-performance  sensitivity  --  Columns  (7)--(9)  --  are  the
ependent  variables.  Both  tables  corroborate  the  results
reviously  reported.
170  F.  López-Iturriaga  et  al.
Table  9  Two-stage  least  squares  estimates  of  the  baseline  models.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (6)  (5)
INSTIT  −0.921** −4.812***
(0.442)  (1.243)
INSTIT·ROA 0.195**
(0.0868)
RESIST 16.94  −100.4***
(48.59)  (36.18)
RESIST·ROA 58.99***
(22.39)
SENSIT −328.2*** −301.9***
(76.46)  (80.57)
SENSIT·ROA −12.57
(12.29)
SIZE 88.20*** 87.54*** 91.56*** 90.49*** 82.33*** 91.88***
(5.086)  (5.103)  (5.084)  (5.499)  (7.133)  (5.088)
LEV −50.78  −75.04  −65.61  42.91  125.1  −72.76
(52.52) (52.79)  (50.78)  (62.94)  (99.35)  (51.20)
MTB 2.143  2.725  2.205  0.753  −0.821  1.872
(1.986) (1.991)  (1.943)  (2.174)  (2.959)  (1.967)
ROA 0.112  0.182  −0.156  −2.116  −3.910* 0.131
(0.977) (0.981)  (0.964)  (1.398)  (2.056)  (1.003)
Observations  433  433  433  433  433  433
R-squared 0.508  0.503  0.524  0.434  0.367  0.525
This table provides the estimated coefﬁcients (t-stats) through the two least squares model. The dependent variable is RETRIB. See
Appendix for variable deﬁnitions.
* Conﬁdence at 90% level.
** Conﬁdence at 95% level.
*** Conﬁdence at 99% level.
Table  10  Two-stage  least  squares  estimates.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
FIXCOMP FIXCOMP  FIXCOMP  VARCOMP  VARCOMP  VARCOMP  SENSITIVITY  SENSITIVITY  SENSITIVITY
INSTIT  0.536*** −0.205  0.0101
(0.175)  (0.128)  (0.0219)
RESIST −63.04** 43.61** −0.586
(24.59)  (18.00)  (0.436)
SENSIT 40.32*** −56.61*** −2.220*
(12.87)  (9.719)  (1.330)
SIZE −3.508*** −3.327*** −3.401*** 1.777*** 1.194* 1.212* 0.00954  0.00380  −0.00368
(0.862) (0.941)  (0.876)  (0.636)  (0.699)  (0.646)  (0.0377)  (0.0418)  (0.0477)
LEV 11.49  25.21** 0.175  4.397  −3.808  8.885  −0.489  −0.987* −1.303*
(8.594)  (10.74)  (9.622)  (6.325)  (7.944)  (6.897)  (0.354)  (0.452)  (0.637)
MTB −0.759** −1.079*** −0.514  −0.0304  0.190  −0.0755  −0.00981  −0.00899  −0.000906
(0.327) (0.375)  (0.348)  (0.237)  (0.273)  (0.249)  (0.0127)  (0.0161)  (0.0203)
ROA 0.00792  −0.0193  0.00901  0.188  0.274* 0.233* −0.00271  −0.0166* −0.0152
(0.163) (0.179)  (0.166)  (0.129)  (0.143)  (0.132)  (0.00625)  (0.00764)  (0.00824)
Observations  428  428  428  428  428  428  416  416  416
R-squared 0.116  0.195  0.075  0.142  0.181  0.107  0.234  0.163  0.118
This table provides the estimated coefﬁcients (t-stats) through the two least squares model. The dependent variables are FIXCOMP,
VARCOMP and SENSITIVITY. See Appendix for variable deﬁnitions.
* Conﬁdence at 90% level.
** Conﬁdence at 95% level.
*** Conﬁdence at 99% level.
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pressure-resistant  institutional  investors
SENSITROA  Interaction  of  SENSIT  and  ROA  variablesInstitutional  directors  and  board  compensation  
Concluding remarks
Director  remuneration  has  been  the  focus  of  considerable
attention  from  the  public,  media,  academia,  and  the  pol-
icymakers  in  recent  years.  The  debate  can  be  approached
from  various  angles:  as  optimal  pay  structure  for  aligning
pay  with  performance  to  reduce  agency  costs;  as  a  regula-
tory  issue  with  the  objective  of  remedying  any  system  ﬂaws;
and  as  a  public  policy  concern.
Although  prior  research  has  provided  signiﬁcant  insights
on  the  relation  between  institutional  investors  and  man-
agerial  compensation,  little  is  still  know  about  the  board
members  compensation.  It  is  a  relevant  topic  since,  unlike
managers,  directors  are  supposed  to  set  their  own  compen-
sation,  which  gives  rise  to  new  incentives  and  conﬂicts
of  interests.  Thus,  the  contributions  of  our  research  are
twofold:  ﬁrst,  we  study  the  effect  of  institutional  investors
on  directors’  compensation  rather  than  managerial  compen-
sation.  Second,  we  focus  on  the  effect  of  institutional
investors  as  directors  rather  than  owners.  Both  issues  have
not  been  addressed  by  previous  research.
We  analyze  the  role  of  institutional  directors  in  compen-
sation  policies  of  Spanish  listed  ﬁrms  during  the  period
2004--2010.  Heidrick  and  Struggles  (2011)  ﬁnd  that  Spain  is
the  European  country  with  the  highest  proportion  of  direc-
tors  representing  institutional  investors.  Thus,  the  Spanish
case  provides  new  insights  to  the  international  governance
literature  (Baixauli-Soler  and  Sánchez-Marín,  2011;  Firth
et  al.,  2007)  and  allows  capturing  the  relation  between  insti-
tutional  investors  and  compensation  policies  better  than  in  a
US  or  UK  setting,  where  directors  appointed  by  institutional
investors  are  less  common.
Our  research  corroborates  the  view  that  institutional
investors  are  far  from  being  a  monolithic  group  and  under-
line  the  differences  among  different  types  of  directors
regarding  objectives,  stability,  scrutiny,  and  visibility.  We
make  a  distinction  between  those  directors  appointed  by
institutional  investors  who  maintain  business  relations  with
the  ﬁrm  on  whose  board  they  sit  (pressure-sensitive  direc-
tors)  and  those  appointed  by  institutional  investors  whose
business  activity  is  not  related  to  the  company  in  which
they  hold  a  directorship  (pressure-resistant  directors).  We
study  the  impact  of  institutional  directors  on  two  aspects
of  remuneration  policy:  composition  and  sensitivity.  We  also
check  whether  institutional  directors  have  a  signiﬁcant  mod-
erating  effect  on  the  relation  between  performance  and
board  remuneration.  Speciﬁcally,  we  ﬁnd  that  only  the  direc-
tors  appointed  by  pressure-resistant  institutional  investors,
compared  to  pressure-sensitive  institutional  investors,
effectively  reduce  the  ﬁxed  component  of  board  remu-
neration  and  increase  the  pay-for-performance  sensitivity.
Conversely,  the  pressure-sensitive  directors  decrease  the
total  board  compensation  and  the  variable  component  of
the  compensation  package.
Taken  together,  these  results  suggest  that  directors
appointed  by  pressure-resistant  investors  serve  a  superior
monitoring  role  in  mitigating  the  agency  problems  inside
the  ﬁrm  by  enhancing  the  role  of  the  compensation  as
a  mechanism  of  corporate  governance  and  making  the
board  compensation  more  tied  to  the  ﬁrm’s  performance.
These  results  conﬁrm  that  institutional  investors’  ﬁduciary
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esponsibilities, conﬂicts  of  interest,  and  information  asym-
etry  interact  with  each  other  to  determine  jointly  the
nﬂuence  of  institutional  investors  on  remuneration.  Other
heoretical  arguments  to  support  our  results  can  be  found  in
he  different  attitude  toward  risk  between  different  types
f  directors.
Our  research  has  interesting  academic  and  policy  implica-
ions  for  the  debate  over  the  proper  degree  of  institutional
nvolvement  in  corporate  governance.  When  analysing  the
ole  of  institutional  investors,  researchers  must  take  into
ccount  investors’  participation  in  other  mechanisms  of  cor-
orate  control  such  as  the  board  of  directors  and  their
ifferent  agendas  and  incentives  for  corporate  governance.
n  particular,  directors  appointed  by  institutional  investors
hould  not  be  considered  as  a  homogenous  group,  especially
n  a  context  in  which  the  main  agency  conﬂict  stems  from
 divergence  of  interests  between  dominant  and  minority
hareholders  and  where  the  role  of  institutional  directors  is
ighly  relevant.  These  ﬁndings  have  important  public  policy
mplications  and  suggest  that  regulatory  organizations  could
evisit  their  policies  on  large  equity  positions  of  directors
ppointed  by  institutional  investors  and  the  ability  of  groups
f  institutional  investors  to  have  more  to  say  in  compensa-
ion  governance  practices.
Our  paper  has  some  limitations  that  could  be  addressed
n  future  research.  First,  the  interaction  between  both  ways
f  institutional  investors  inﬂuence  (ownership  and  director-
hips)  could  be  introduced  jointly.  It  could  enhance  testing
hether  there  are  substitute  or  complementary  effects
etween  them.  Another  avenue  for  research  is  analyzing  the
resence  of  institutional  directors  in  the  compensation  com-
ittee  rather  than  in  the  whole  board  of  directors.  Third,
nce  a  longer  time  period  was  available,  the  attention  could
e  paid  to  the  effect  of  the  ﬁnancial  crisis  and  the  extent
o  which  the  allegedly  new  compensation  design  is  a  right
nswer  to  the  new  ﬁnancial  scenario.
ppendix. Variable deﬁnitions
ariables  Description
ETRIB  Total  compensation  of  the  board  divided  by
the  number  of  directors
IXCOMP  Fixed  component  of  the  total  compensation
of the  board
ARCOMP  Variable  component  of  the  total
compensation  of  the  board
ENSITIVITY  Variation  in  the  compensation  of  the  board
relative  to  the  variation  of  return  on  assets
(ROA)  between  the  previous  and  the
current  year.
NSTIT  Proportion  of  directors  who  represent
institutional  investors
ENSIT  Proportion  of  the  directors  who  represent
pressure-sensitive  institutional  investors
ESIST  Proportion  of  the  directors  who  representESISTROA  Interaction  of  RESIST  and  ROA  variables
NSTITROA  Interaction  of  INSTIT  and  ROA  variables
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ariables  Description
EV  Ratio  of  book  debt  to  total  assets
TB  Equity  market  to  book  ratio
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